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COMMENTS
THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 7
-SEEKING A RATIONAL DETERMINATION
OF PROBABLE CAUSE
INTRODUCTION
The constitutional convention which drafted Illinois' Constitution of
1870 began a debate which has continued to -the present day. The issue
was and is whether Illinois should continue to require -the grand jury in-
dictment as a prerequisite of felony prosecutions.' The delegates to the
1870 Convention, after deciding that -the legislature should be responsible
for any change in the operation of the grand jury, fashioned the indict-
ment as a constitutional requirement. 2 While it may have been assumed,
in 1870, that the legislature would act promptly to abolish what ,has been
called the "fifth wheel of justice,"' the lawmakers took no action.
In 1970, the delegates to the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention,4
having the benefit of one hundred years experience, had -the opportunity
1. The states are free to allow for prosecutions of felonies other than upon in-
dictment of a grand jury; the fifth amendment's indictment requirement applies only
in the federal system. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
The 1870 Convention's efforts to abolish the grand jury are discussed in Calkins,
Abolition of the Grand Jury Indictment in Illinois, 1966 U. ILL. L. F. 423, and are
summarized in G. BRADEN & R. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN ANNOTATED
AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 34-38 (1969).
2. While the indictment was required in all felony cases, ILL. CONST. art. II,
§ 8 (1870), the Convention provided, in the constitution, that the grand jury "may
be abolished by law in all cases." Id.
3. In a pioneering study of the grand jury, the late Wayne Morse stated:
"Grand juries are likely to be a fifth wheel in the administration of criminal jus-
tice in that they tend to stamp with approval, and often uncritically, the wishes of
the prosecuting attorney." Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, ORE. L. REV.
101, 363 (1931).
At the 1870 Convention, at least one supporter of the abolition of the grand jury
believed that the "fifth wheel" would not be retained long by the legislature: "The
[constitution] abolishes the grand jury so far as misdemeanors are concerned, and
I trust the Legislature will provide for the balance. Public sentiment will not allow
long delay." 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
ILLINOIS, 1869-1870, at 1573 cited in Calkins, supra note 1, at 427.
4. Hereinafter referred to as the Convention.
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to do what the legislature had not done: abolish or limit5 the grand jury.
Once again, the decision was reached that the legislature should be re-
sponsible for any changes in the functioning of the grand jury.6 The con-
vention voted to align Illinois with those states which require felony prose-
cutions to be initiated by grand jury indictment. 7
The Bill of Rights Committee, 8 the drafter of the indictment section,
was nonetheless mindful of the grand jury's shortcomings:
[T~he views of committee members were influenced by the view that the
grand jury indictment, although there has been a determination of probable
cause, that in some cases the grand jury indictment is not, perhaps, really
that different from simply a decision by the prosecutor to present a charge,
because the grand jury has only heard the one side of the case.9
Therefore, the Committee constructed a preliminary hearing section: "No
person shall be held to answer for a crime punishable by death or impris-
onment in the penitentiary without a prompt preliminary hearing to estab-
lish probable cause."'10 This section was designed to cure the vices of the
grand jury and retain its virtues."
The Committee, by requiring the hearing to be held promptly, sought
to achieve a second purpose: making unknown the situation of an accused
spending a prolonged period of time under the disabilities of a charge
while awaiting a probable cause determination.
5. The legislature was able to abolish the right to indictment in less than all
felony cases. People ex rel. Latimer v. Randolph, 13 I11. 2d 552, 554, 150 N.E.2d
603, 604 (1958). The Convention, therefore, was dealing not merely with the possi-
bility of abolishing the grand jury entirely, but with efforts to "limit or make changes
in the use of the grand jury that fall short of abolishing its use in some or all cases."
SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 39 (1972)
(hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS).
6. Article 1, section 7 of the 1970 Constitution provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense unless on indict-
ment of a grand jury, except in cases in which the punishment is by fine
or by imprisonment other than in the penitentiary . . . . The General As-
sembly by law may abolish the grand jurv or further limit its use.
7. Twenty-six states allow for prosecution by either indictment or information.
See Dash, The Indicting Grand Jury: Critical Stage, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 807,
812 n.24 (1972).
8. Hereinafter referred to as the Committee.
9. 3 PROCEEDINGS 1454.
10. 6 PROCEEDINGS 74. Originally designated as Section 23, the preliminary hear-
ing provision which was drafted by the Convention was made part of article I, section
7.
11. "The Committee felt that despite criticism-legitimate and not so legitimate
-of the grand jury, on balance, it still served a useful purpose." 3 PROCEEDINGS
1437. "[The Committee] thought that a grand jury which . . .has investigatory
powers does play a vital role ...and is in a position to contribute a meaningful
service to the community." Id. at 1439.
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In short, the Committee sought to establish, in the Bill of Rights, that
an individual charged with a serious offense is entitled to an adversary
hearing which is to be held shortly after his being charged to determine
probable cause. However, neither goal has been realized.
It is the purpose of this Comment to examine the history of the indict-
ment and preliminary hearing sections of the Illinois Constitution and, by
so doing, to: (1) determine why the goals of the Bill of Rights Committee
were not achieved; (2) offer suggestions which, if implemented, would
(a) provide the accused felon with protection from unwarranted prosecu-
tion, while (b) providing prosecutors with the means of fully performing
their responsibilities to investigate and prosecute; and (3) determine (a)
what rights Illinois courts have found to be contained within the prelimin-
ary hearing section accepted by the Convention, and (b) how 'these rights
may be exercised.
THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
Charging an Offense
The Committee recommendation that the grand jury be retained until
such time as the legislature might abolish or limit its functions was viewed
as a "compromise solution."'1 2  The Committee was advised that any
change in the existing indictment provision would be difficult to enact,' 3
and the advice proved to be correct. As the following statements illus-
trate, the grand jury was viewed entirely differently by its supporters and
critics.
"True Billiever": The greatest asset, I believe, of the grand jury right now
for the individual is the fact that it is a buffer; it is a buffer between
the accusor and the accused. 1 4
"Critic": They [grand jurors] are not students of the law; in a basic sense,
they don't really know what probable cause is. The fact that they
vote a true bill doesn't necessarily mean that there is, in fact, reason
to hold a defendant. 15
"True Billiever": [The prosecutor] certainly did not try to persuade us ...
We deliberated on there as strongly as we did here [at the convention]
and really attempted to find whether this person had reason to be in-
dicted. . . . [Hie does get an extremely, extremely fair trial.' 0
12. It represents a satisfactory compromise between an absolute require-
ment of grand jury indictment and a constitutional arrangement that would
permit routine resort to prosecution filed by the prosecuting attorney.
6 PROCEEDINGS 40.
13. E. GERTZ, FOR THE FIRST HoURs OF TOMORROW: THE NEW ILLINOIS BILL
OF RIGHTS 17 (1972) (Mr. Gertz was chairman of the Bill of Rights Committee).
14. 3 PROCEEDINGS 1449.
15. Id. at 1461.
16. Id. at 1440.
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The disagreement regarding the "buffer" function of the grand jury,
coupled with the recognition even among critics that the grand jury pro-
vides some useful services as an investigator, 17 led the Committee to con-
clude "that it was preferable, on balance, -to have the problem dealt with
by the legislature.""'
The Committee's report indicates rather clearly, however, the belief that
the preliminary hearing was preferable to the grand jury as -a means of
determining probable cause. This conclusion is dictated by the Commit-
tee's description of what would occur in a case where the grand jury indicts
prior to arrest:
mhis new provision [the preliminary hearing section] will require that a
preliminary hearing be held after the indictment has been returned ....
If the judge finds an absence of probable cause, then he should quash the
indictment and discharge the defendant. 1 9
In other words, the Committee believed that a grand jury's determination
of probable cause was not sufficiently reliable; review by a judge would
be required before an accused would have to stand trial.
Delegate Fennoy, a committee member, relayed -to -the Convention
further evidence of -the Committee's preference for the preliminary hearing
as a method of determining probable cause. A prosecutor appearing be-
fore the Committee testified that a state's attorney naturally will not pre-
sent to the grand jury witnesses favorable to the accused. In response
to this testimony, Fennoy reported, -the preliminary hearing section was
suggested. 20
It is clear, therefore, that the Committee did not intend the grand jury
proceeding to be a substitute for the preliminary hearing. Indeed, the
Committee believed that the greatest shortcoming Of the grand jury-a
determination of probable cause solely.on state's evidence-would be
cured by the preliminary hearing provision.
The Committee did not believe that the availability of the grand jury
would tempt a prosecutor to dishonor the finding reached at the prelimin-
ary hearing. According to the Committee's spokesman, Delegate Weis-
berg,_the existence of the two mechanisms, each capable of determining
probable cause, would not lead to instability in the prosecutorial system.
If the decision reached at the preliminary hearing were one of no prob-
able cause,
17. See note 11 supra.
18. 3 PROCEEDINGS 1438.
19. 6 PRocEEDINGS 76.
20. See 3 PROCEEDINoS 1439. -
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Mr. Weisberg: mhe intention of the committee is that that would not bar
another effort by the prosecution to indict.
Mr. Jaskula: You would have a vicious circle then, wouldn't you?
Mr. Weisberg: .. . I think we felt justified in assuming that the prose-
cutor would not do that unless he felt that he had additional evidence
to present. ..21
The grand jury and preliminary hearing were expected to work together
harmoniously. If the indictment preceded arrest, the finding reached by
the grand jury at an ex parte proceeding would be reviewed by the judge
at an adversary 22 proceeding. The judge could dismiss the indictment if
he determined that probable cause did not, in fact, exist.23 If arrest pre-
ceded indictment, the preliminary hearing would be held to determine
probable cause, .but a finding of no probable cause by the judge would
not bar the bringing of new charges. 24 A positive finding would still re-
quire review by the grand jury. Twelve of the twenty-three grand jurors
would have to concur in the judge's finding if the prosecution were to pro-
ceed. The grand jury in this situation would presumably be the defend-
ant's last -line of defense against government oppression. Exactly how
practical this defense was expected to be is unclear. However, the avail-
able evidence indicates that grand jury deliberation which follows the
preliminary hearing is little more than a rubber stamp of the prosecutor's
decision to charge. 25
21. Id. at 1455.
22. 6 PROCEEDINGS 76.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. In 1964, Cook County grand juries returned no bills in only nine percent of
the cases presented to them. D. OAKS & W. LEHMAN, A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
AND THE INDIGENT 44 (1968). However,
only 7 to 10 percent of the no bills, which would be about 1% of the total
indictments sought, were instances of real screening for lack of evidence.
The rest of the no bills were but examples of a record keeping device. At
preliminary hearing, a defendant may be bound over on several charges.
• .. The Code of Criminal Procedure allows them to be embodied in a
single indictment, with multiple counts. The defendant, meanwhile, has
been held by the jailor on three separate mittimi, one for each charge. To
extinguish the two surplus mittimi, the grand jury enters a no bill on two
of the charges.
Id. at 44-45.
I In 1973, Cook County grand juries returned no bills in less than four percent of
their cases. Chicago Tribune, July 23, 1974, at 7, col. 3. If the "record keeping"
percentage has *remained constant, the grand jury failed to charge in less than one
percent of the cases in. which indictments were sought.
, The observation of a 'one time magistrate; "that in every instance in which [he]
found probable cause, . . . the grand jury has subsequently returned an indictment
against the accused," Calkins, suprq-note 1, at 440, is,-.therefore, descriptive. of grand
jury deliberation which follows the preliminary hearing.
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The Committee recognized that while the grand jury may provide some
useful investigative services, its ability to fairly determine probable cause
is, in most cases, suspect. A preliminary hearing requirement was deemed
necessary to correct this deficiency. The question becomes: is the review
of indictments, which may be returned in all situations, the most effective
way of limiting the grand jury to the function it can best perform? An
understanding of the benefit the grand jury can provide in the investigation
of criminal activity will illustrate that it is not. This understanding, on
the other hand, will disclose a model which will achieve a fair determina-
tion of probable cause, offer the individual a meaningful opportunity to
avoid unwarranted prosecutions, and aid the prosecutor in performing his
responsibility to investigate.
The grand jury in Illinois is under the direction of the state's attorney. 26
It is the prosecutor, and not the grand jurors, who is primarily responsible
for investigating suspected criminal acts.27 If the grand jury is of any in-
vestigative value, it is only because its subpoena powers may be utilized
,by the prosecutor to compel witnesses to appear before the grand jurors,
and not because it initiates investigations in the first instance. 28
What function, then, does the grand jury perform when it merely re-
ceives evidence gathered by the prosecutor? It provides a review of the
prosecutor's judgment that a charge should be brought. 29  The evidence
26. "The Grand Jury shall hear all evidence presented by the State's Attorney."
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 112-4(a) (1973).
27. While the court "may appoint an investigator . . . on petition showing good
cause . . . and signed by the foreman and 11 other grand jurors," ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 112-5(b) (1973), the grand jury is expected to depend upon the prosecutor's
investigative resources:
[I]t is the duty of the grand jury to inquire into offenses which shall come
to its knowledge "whether from the court, the State's Attorney, its own
members, or from any source," . . . but it is clear from the holding in Peo-
ple v. Parker, 374 Ill. 524, that the proper channel for presenting informa-
tion to the grand jury is the State's Attorney . . . and it is improper to
communicate directly with the grand jury.
People v. Sears, 49 Ill. 2d 14, 29, 273 N.E.2d 380, 388 (1971) (citation omitted).
28. Historically, grand jurors have been responsible for developing evidence, as
opposed to merely passing judgment upon evidence presented to them, in situations
where, as in England, no public prosecutor existed (see Whyte, Is the Grand Jury
Necessary?, 45 VA. L. REV. 461, 482-83 (1959)), or where executive investigative
agencies lacked sufficient resources (see Comment, The Grand Jury Witness' Privi-
lege Against Self-incrimination, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 207, 209-16 (1967)). Currently,
however, both the police and prosecutor do exist and are sufficiently funded to prop-
erly investigate criminal activity. Therefore, it cannot be suggested that the grand
jury generally provides investigation that would otherwise not occur.
29. In theory, the grand jury represents protection against unwarranted prosecu-
tion:
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available, however, indicates that when grand juries are asked only to re-
view a decision to prosecute, they are unlikely to seriously challenge the
prosecutor's case.30 As the Committee recognized, the indictment may
represent nothing more than the prosecutor's decision to charge an offense.
Thus, no effective "buffer" is created by requiring the prosecutor to submit
his case to the grand jury for review.
If the prosecutor has determined that evidence exists which will support
a charge, subpoena powers are not needed, and therefore, the grand jury
should play no role in the charging procedure. The prosecutor should be
required to place the charge and have it tested at an adversary preliminary
hearing.3' In other words, when no investigative services are required,
Historically [the grand jury] has been regarded as a primary security to
the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution; it serves
the invaluable function in our society of standing between the accuser and
the accused . . . to determine whether a charge is founded upon reason or
was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will.
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
30. Grand juries in Cook County, for example, return "substantive" no bills in
about one percent of the cases brought before them. See note 25 supra. The vast
majority of these cases are brought to the grand jury after arrest (see 6 PROCEEDINGS
76), or in other words, when the grand jurors are asked only to review a charge al-
ready filed. If post-arrest, grand jury deliberation represents 95 percent of the cases
(as Delegate Weisberg believed, 3 PROCEEDINGS 1462), and all no bills were returned
in these cases, the grand jury would disagree with the prosecutor's decision to charge
(after arrest) scarcely more than one percent of the time (1/95). In fact, it is likely
that when the grand jury is only called upon to review a pending charge, it will dis-
agree with the prosecutor in far less than one percent of the cases.
The suggestion is fanciful that grand jurors will critically review evidence presented
by the prosecutor against an individual whom the prosecutor has already decided
should be tried. The probability of the grand jurors rejecting a case based only upon
evidence probative of guilt (see text accompanying note 20 supra) is, common sense
would dictate, barely positive. It would not be unreasonable to assume that, at best,
one-half of the no bills are returned in those cases where a decision to prosecute has
been made prior to grand jury deliberation. Thus, the true "disagreement" ratio is
not 1/95 but perhaps 1//95 (5 cases out of 1000).
The fact that so few no bills are returned does not indicate that only "strong"
cases are presented by the prosecutor. In 1972, for example, there were 4,486 felony
dispositions at the trial stage in Cook County. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE ILLI-
NOIS COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT 120 (1972). Of these cases,
1,613 were dismissed (1,167-stricken with leave to refile, 253-nolle prosequi, 193-dis-
posed of in some other manner). Undoubtedly some cases involved defense contin-
uances which frustrated prosecution, problems with key witnesses and the like. But
even assuming that all 253 cases which were nolle prosequi involved pleas and one-
half of the SOL cases (584) were "frustrated," 776 indictments were too weak to be
tried. This yields a "weakness" ratio of 776/4,486 or .17, far above the grand jury's
"disagreement" ratio of .005. The indictment, in other words, provides no reasonable
indication that a case will be decided on its merits.
31. In those situations where the prosecutor has decided to charge, it is clear that
the "independence" of the grand jury provides, practically, no meaningful check. See
note 30 supra. The adversary hearing, to be sure, includes an "independent" fact
19751
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the "information" should replace the grand jury indictment as the method
used to initiate prosecutions.82
The Committee believed that the "information" would provide the
prosecutor with a "routine resort to prosecution. 88  This notion, however,
is incorrect. Allowing for prosecution by information is not necessarily
the equivalent of allowing the prosecutor, alone, to determine probable
cause.3 4 If a complaint is filed by the prosecutor in the proposed informa-
,tion system, arrest may certainly be effectuated. 35 But the filing of the
complaint will not establish the existence of probable cause.36 Trial upon
the charge will ensue only after the judge at the preliminary hearing has
finder. But this is not what recommends it as a means for determining probable
cause.
By offering the accused adversary tools at the hearing (the right to cross-examine
and present evidence), the boundaries of the inquiries may be expanded, something
which would not occur in the grand jury room. It is this expansion, rather than the
"independence" of the fact finder which provides a meaningful buffer against unwar-
ranted charges.
32. This would include all cases in which individuals have been arrested with
or without warrants, and all cases where the prosecutor does not require the subpoena
powers of the grand jury.
33. 6 PROCEEDINGS 40.
34. See, e.g.:
[N]o person shall be prosecuted for a felony by information without having
had a preliminary examination before an examining magistrate, or having
waived such preliminary examination.
OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 17.
No prosecuting or circuit attorney in this state shall file any information
charging any person or persons with any felony, until such person or per-
sons shall first have been accorded the right of a preliminary examination.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 544.250 (1974 Supp.).
35. Under the present system the prosecutor may file a complaint and seek an
arrest warrant. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 107-9(c) (1973). This practice would,
of course, be continued.
36. If a prosecuting official cannot properly issue a search warrant in a case
he is prosecuting [see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)].
then he is a fortiori not a proper person for determining the existence of
probable cause to hold an accused for trial.
Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107, 1115 (S.D. Fla. 1971), aff'd, 483 F.2d 778
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nom. Gerstein v. Pugh, 414 U.S. 1062 (1973).
The Supreme Court has held that the due process clause does not require a hearing
prior to the filing of an information. Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913).
However, the Pugh decision rested upon the fourth as well as the fourteenth amend-
ment:
A criminal system wherein the individual faces prolonged imprisonment
upon the sole authority of the police and or the prosecutor violates the prin-
ciples . . . which are the essence of the constitutional guarantees of freedom
from unreasonable seizure and deprivation without due process of law.
The court finds that under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, ar-
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decided that trial is warranted. 7  The "information" will be filed after
the preliminary hearing as a substitute for the "indictment;" it is used
merely as a means of providing the defendant with due process notice (as
does the "indictment," assuring the defendant that he will not be required
,to defend against that with which he has not been charged), and as a
means of establishing the focus of the prosecution for purposes of avoiding
double jeopardy (as does the "indictment"). This type of substitution
provides no "routine resort," 'because the prosecutor is not given the power
to compel an individual to stand trial upon the charge brought. The
charge can be tried only after a determination of probable cause reached
at an adversary38 preliminary hearing.
Recognition that the grand jury serves no useful purpose when it is
asked merely to review a prosecutor's decision to charge does not mean
that the grand jury is entirely without utility. Its power to compel the
appearance of witnesses, especially when coupled with a grant of immun-
ity, is a valuable aid in uncovering evidence of criminal activity. Such
power, does not, however, exist within the executive, investigative agencies
(the prosecutor and police). The investigative service provided by the
grand jury should, therefore, be retained.
rested persons, whether or not released on bond, have the constitutional
right to a judicial hearing on the question of probable cause.
332 F. Supp. at 1113, 1115 (emphasis added). Thus, Pugh is distinguishable from
Lem Woon, the former focusing upon the question of seizure and the latter upon the
legitimacy of the information system according to general principles of due process.
By requiring a hearing prior to trial in order to establish the "reasonableness" of the
seizure, the Supreme Court can affirm Pugh without the necessity of overruling Lem
Woon.
37. This proposal has, of course, been offered in the past. However, legislative
efforts in Illinois to effectuate an information system which would include the pre-
liminary hearing as the mechanism for determining probable cause have not, to date,
succeeded. The latest attempt, which managed to pass the House only to be buried
in the Senate, provides:
All prosecutions of felonies shall be by information or by indictment. No
prosecution may be pursued by information unless a preliminary hearing has
been held or waived. . . and at that hearing probable cause. . . was found.
H.B. 2372, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973) (Introduced Apr. 5, 1974).
38. Legislative attempts to make definite the defendant's rights (see note 91 inlra,
and accompanying text) at the preliminary hearing have been unsuccessful. A house
bill, buried in the Senate provides:
Prior to the preliminary hearing or examination the defendant shall have
the right to subpoena witnesses. During preliminary hearing or examina-
tion the defendant shall have the right to be heard, to present evidence ...
to cross-examine witnesses. ...
H.B. 2373, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973) (Introduced Apr. 5, 1974).
The investigative service cannot, however, be performed without the
grand jury's being able to determine whether the fruits of its investigation
support a charge. The power of subpoena does not exist to provide the
prosecutor with a means of discovery; it exists to aid the grand jurors in
their decision as to whether a criminal charge shall be brought.
The Committee believed that the grand jury's decision should be re-
viewed at a preliminary hearing. In this way, it was believed that the
benefit of grand jury investigation could be retained while providing the
defendant with an opportunity to develop a balanced view of the evidence.
However, by requiring a duplication of the probab!e cause determination,
the Committee's scheme attached no finality to either the grand jury's or
the judge's finding and provided no method of insuring that the grand jury
would, in fact, be used for investigative purposes. In addition, the scheme
contained no safeguards to help assure that the grand jury's decision would
represent an independent39 judgment. All of these infirmities could be
cured if the function of, and access to, the grand jury were specifically
limited.
The prosecutor, as has been suggested earlier, should not have access
to the grand jury unless its subpoena powers are needed to fully investigate
a situation.4 0  Simply providing the prosecutor with the option of proceed-
ing by way of information or indictment might achieve the desired result.4 1
However, limiting the availability of the grand jury, by requiring the prose-
cutor to request the convening of a grand jury and to show good cause
that subpoena powers are needed, will insure investigation and not mean-
ingless review.4 2
39. The Committee's suggestion that the preliminary hearing could follow indict-
ment might help to avoid unwarranted trials, but a non-independent grand jury would
not protect an individual from having to assume the disabilities attaching to an un-
warranted charge.
40. See notes 30-32 supra and accompanying text.
41. When the prosecutor is provided with an option, it appears that most prosecu-
tions will be initiated by information. An early study indicated that the indictment
would be used in only six to ten percent of the cases. Moley, Initiation of Criminal
Prosecutions by Indictment or Information, 29 MICH. L. REV. 403, 413 (1931).
More recent statistics show that in one urban area the indictment is used in only
about three percent of the felony prosecutions. Graham & Letwin, The Preliminary
Hearing in Los Angeles, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 636, 678 n.155 (1970). A simple op-
tion would not, of course, preclude the prosecutor from seeking an indictment after a
judge has found no probable cause.
42. Grand juries which are required to be in session, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 112-3(a) (1973), or routinely called upon motion of the state's attorney, see ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 112-3(b) (1973), are able to act in all situations-those in
which investigation is required and those in which it is not. To insure that it is only
in the former situations the grand jury is called, the prosecutor should be required
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As the "investigative" grand jurors will be called upon to evaluate the
information obtained through the subpoena power, the prosecutor will
necessarily have to present evidence which he has gathered that establishes
the basis of a possible charge. The "basis" evidence will not of course
represent the prosecutor's judgment that probable cause exists. If the
evidence did represent such a judgment, no subpoena power would be
necessary and the prosecutor would be required to proceed by way of in-
formation. Therefore, the grand jurors will be instructed: (1) that the
information initially gathered by the prosecutor does not warrant the
bringing of a charge; (2) that a charge may be brought only if additional,
relevant information is uncovered which (3) sufficiently adds to the
"basis" evidence to establish that a particular individual is probably
responsible for the commission of a crime.
In the proposed information-grand jury system, the indictment will not
be reviewed at a preliminary hearing. Thus, the individual named in an
indictment will not have the opportunity, as does the individual named
in an information, to challenge prior to trial the charge leveled against
him. For several reasons this difference in treatment is justified: (1) The
grand jury will not be available as a means of review when the prosecutor
wishes only to present what he believes is evidence establishing probable
cause; (2) the grand jury will be instructed that the evidence available
prior to its convening does not warrant indictment; and (3) the focus of
the grand jury will be the uncovering of evidence which may, when viewed
in light of existing evidence, support a charge. These considerations
to attest that individuals believed to have information are unwilling to co-operate with
him.
Another requirement might also be imposed: A grand jury shall not be convened
unless a judge determines that the "public interest so demands." ALI CODE OF CIM-
INAL PROCEDURE, § 114 (Official Draft 1930); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.27.030
(1973 Supp.). The "public interest" showing is aimed at limiting the grand jury in-
vestigation to those situations which "affect the members of the community as a
whole, rather than individuals." Segal, Spivack & Costillo, Obtaining A Grand Jury
Investigation in Pennsylvania, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 73, 79 (1961). To be avoided "is the
investigation of individuals on allegations of ordinary crimes solely for the purpose
of uncovering wrongdoings of that person." Id. at 86. Implicit in the "public inter-
est" requirement is the idea that it is preferable to place a charge and have it tested
at a hearing, rather than have the charge arise out of an ex parte proceeding which
offers the defendant no opportunity to challenge the evidence prior to trial. There-
fore, before the grand jury is convened, it should be established that there is some
compelling reason to curtail the potential defendant's rights. See Commonwealth v.
McCloskey, 443 Pa. 117, 277 A.2d 764 (1971). This reason would include a show-
ing that "the ordinary processes of law [are] inadequate to cope with . . . a matter
• . . affect[ing] the members of the community as a whole, rather than individuals.
The investigation must be aimed at condiions and not primarily at individuals."
Segal, et. al, supra at 79.
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create within the grand jury an effective independence which assures that
the determination of probable cause is not a meaningless exercise. 43
When Shall the Preliminary Hearing be Held?
The Committee believed that the existing statutory provisions 44 concern-
ing the preliminary hearing were not producing promptly held hearings. 45
It is not clear, however, why the constitutional command of "promptness"
was expected to be more successful than the statutory directive. It may
be, that as the statute does not indicate with any definiteness when the
judge must hold the hearing,40 an imprecise constitutional directive was
expected to demand respect, whereas an unclear statute invites avoid-
ance. Yet the Committee Report can be read as encouraging the latter
response rather than the former.
The Report suggests that in determining "promptness," emphasis should
'be placed "upon the essential purpose that a person speedily receive the
important rights listed above (confrontation, cross-examination, presenta-
tion of evidence), including prompt and public presentation of sufficient
43. It may be suggested, as did the Committee, that the investigative value of the
grand jury would not be lessened if a preliminary hearing were required to follow
indictment. However, besides being awkward, this could result in "passing the buck."
That is if the grand jurors decision to charge were not final, they might routinely
indict, expecting the judge at the preliminary hearing to ferret out the weak cases.
Cf. Calkins, supra note 1, at 440: "[iut must be recognized that some magistrates
knowing that a case will be subsequently heard by the grand jury, will give only cur-
sory attention to the preliminary hearing."
44. "The judge shall [hiold a preliminary hearing in those cases where the judge
is without jurisdiction to try the offense." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-1(b)(3)
(1973). "The judge shall hold the defendant to answer . . . if from the evidence
it appears there is probable cause to believe an offense has been committed by the
defendant." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-3(a) (1973).
45. Delegate Fennoy reported that his experience in St. Clair and Madison coun-
ties showed that, in eight years, perhaps five preliminary hearings were held. See
3 PROCEEDINGS 1457. The Committee was of the belief that "the actual practice
seems to have repudiated the words of the statute." GERTZ, supra note 13, at 168.
46. The judge, according to statute is required to hold a hearing if no indictment
is returned prior to the scheduled date of the hearing, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 111-
2(a) (1973); People v. Petruso, 35 Il1. 2d 578, 221 N.E.2d 276 (1966). However,
no specifics are provided as to when the date shall be scheduled.
In practice, an arrestee is "taken without unnecessary delay before the . . . judge
. . . and a charge .. . filed." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-1(a) (1973). The
judge will not, however, hold a heating at the initial appearance. This is desirable,
as the defendant is unprepared to challenge the charge at this point. At the very
least, time is required to obtain counsel to represent the defendant at the preliminary
hearing (right to be represented by counsel is constitutionally mandated, Coleman
v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1971)). But the fact remains that the various statutory
provisions regarding the preliminary hearing provide no clue as to when it must be
held, or under what circumstances a continuance will be granted.
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evidence to demonstrate . . . probable cause. . ." 4 But this is pre-
ceded by an investiture: "The determination of what is a 'prompt' pre-
liminary hearing is left to judicial construction. ' 48 Judges who could not
"construct" preliminary hearings out of the statute49 were invited to make
their determination "in light of all the circumstances." 50
A basic assumption underlying an effective preliminary hearing require-
ment is that the prosecutor is perfectly able to demonstrate the existence
of probable cause shortly after the individual's arrest. The purpose of
the hearing is to establish the validity of the arrest and not to "make the
case." If no reason can be shown to hold the accused for trial, the defend-
ant should not have to bear the burdens which attach to a criminal charge.
The preliminary hearing, therefore, fails of its purpose unless held shortly
after arrest. Judicial construction is not required to effectuate speed;
resort to "all the circumstances" is unnecessary. Rather, the determina-
tion of when the preliminary hearing is to be held requires a practical
solution; legislation to implement the constitutional principle is required. 5'
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contain a preliminary hearing
scheme which is an instructive model. The magistrate must set the date
for the hearing at a reasonable time not to exceed ten days if the accused
is in custody, and not to exceed twenty days if bail has been posted.
52
The time may be extended with the defendant's consent upon a showing
of good cause. 53 Without the defendant's consent, the time may be ex-
tended only upon a showing that "extraordinary circumstances exist and
delay is indispensable to the interests of justice."'54
The importance of insuring that hearings are promptly held is illustrated
by examining Cook County's disposition of charges at the preliminary
47. 6 PROCEEDINGS 75-76.
48. Id. at 75.
49. Supra note 45.
50. 6 PROCEEDINGS 75.
51. ILLINOIS REVISED STATUTE, Chapter 38, § 103-5 (1973), the Speedy Trial pro-
vision, is an example of legislation which is necessary to make meaningful a consti-
tutional directive. Section 103-5 provides, basically, for trial within 120 days if the
accused is in custody, and trial within 160 days if bail has been posted. It is clear
that if judges were left free to "construct" speediness, defendants would have little
idea of what to expect, much litigation would ensue, and the results would lack con-
sistency. The preliminary hearing situation, without legislative implementation, pro-
vides the potential for just these kinds of problems.
52. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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hearing stage. In 1964, of the 16,84655 felony charges filed, only 3,817
or 23 percent resulted in findings of probable cause. The remaining
charges were either dismissed (17 percent), dismissed for want of prosecu-
tion (9 percent), nolle prosequi56 (38 percent), stricken with leave to
refile (12 percent), or disposed of in some other fashion (1 percent).
The statistics indicate that 39 percent of the charges filed were never
prosecuted 57 and some percentage of defendants, originally charged with
felonies, were ultimately charged with, or plead to misdemeanors. 58  It
is of course crucial that it be determined at the earliest possible moment
which defendants will be prosecuted. The earlier the decision is made,
the less hardship will be suffered by those who face unwarranted charges.
Legislative implementation of the "promptness" requirement will insure
that the decision will be made at the earliest practical moment, and that
a significant percentage of individuals charged will not have to be unneces-
sarily burdened for prolonged periods of time.
THE CONVENTION ACTS-THE PARKHURST AMENDMENT
The Committee recommendation that the "indictment" remain a pre-
requisite to felony prosecutions was accepted by the body of the Conven-
55. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
SUPREME COURT 82 (1964).
56. Charges which are nolle prosequi (prosecutor's wish not to proceed) involve
either the dropping of felony complaints and refiling as misdemeanors, see OAKS &
LEHMAN, supra note 25, at 43, or pleas (according to the Office of the Clerk of the
Circuit Court of Cook County).
57. Charges dismissed on the merits (17%), dismissed for want of prosecution
(9%), stricken off with leave to refile (SOL) (12%), and "other" (1%), total 39%.
It must be pointed out that charges which are SOL may subsequently be prosecuted
and that charges which are dismissed on the merits may later be made part of an
indictment. See People v. Kent, 54 Ill. 2d 161, 295 N.E.2d 710 (1973). However,
it seems that the 39 percent "non-prosecution" ratio is accurate in light of the fact
that a substantial percentage of indictments do not get tried. Note 30 supra.
Although currently, Cook County's first district (Chicago) does not record any dis-
positions at the preliminary hearing other than findings of probable cause, see AD-
MINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS, STATISTICAL REPORT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT OF COOK COUNTY 11 (1973), the "non-prosecution" ratio, in Cook County,
appears to have increased in recent years. In 1973, there were 22,749 felony charges
filed (figure supplied by the Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook
County). There were 4,799 findings of probable cause, id., which findings repre-
sented 21 percent of all charges filed. This is slightly lower than the 23 percent
figure of 1964. The suburban, Cook County districts, meanwhile, had a "non-prose-
cution" ratio of about 60%. Of 6,129 dispositions, 414 charges were dismissed on
the merits, 255 dismissed for want of prosecution, 2,602 stricken with leave to refile,
and 620 disposed of in some other manner. Id.
While the suburban dispositions represented only about 27 percent of charges filed
in the County, the high "non-prosecution" ratio outside Chicago indicates that the
county wide ratio is somewhat higher than the 39 percent of 1964.
58. Note 56 supra.
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tion. An amendment offered by Delegate Canfield, which provided that
"all offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by amendment may be
prosecuted by indictment or information," 59 was defeated by voice vote.
The Convention was offered the opportunity to infuse a greater amount
of rationality into the criminal justice system; it chose not to accept the
challenge. The convention refused to bury the myth that the grand jury
provides a meaningful check upon the prosecutor's decision to charge an
offense. Attention turned to the Committee's preliminary hearing recom-
mendation.
The Committee majority presented the preliminary hearing to the dele-
gates as
the basic right of every person, before he is going to be required to stand
trial or be held to answer on a serious criminal charge, to have the judge
hold a preliminary hearing and decide there is some reasonable basis for
subjecting the defendant to that situation. 60
The Committee minority believed that the right to a preliminary hearing
need not be elevated to constitutional heights because the hearing dupli-
cated the efforts of the grand jury. 6 ' Delegate Lennon, a minority mem-
ber, was personally in favor of a "latent" constitutional provision-one
which would take effect if and when the legislature abolished or limited
the use of the grand jury. He offered such an amendment as a substitute
for the majority recommendation.
Coupled with the criticism that the preliminary hearing duplicated the
efforts of the grand jurors was the observation that legislation existed
which provided a right to a hearing in the absence of indictment, 62 and
59. 3 PROCEEDINGS 1444. Canfield criticized the grand jury system as "cumber-
some, expensive ...cruel." Id. at 1441. He believed that "[w]hatever the prose-
cutor says, they want to do. Id. at 1445.
60. 3 PROCEEDINGS. 1466.
61. Since the only question before a grand jury is "probable cause" and since
the preliminary hearing also decides "probable cause," the Majority proposal
requires a duplication of the same finding ...
In any event, if the Convention wants to retain the grand jury, a "probable
cause" preliminary hearing ought not duplicate the grand jury effort.
6 PROCEEDINGS 152 (Minority Report IE).
62. According to statute, the return of an indictment prior to the scheduled ex-
amination obviates the necessity of the preliminary hearing. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 111-2 (1973). It was the belief of several delegates who chose to speak on the
subject that the situation was adequately covered by legislation. One delegate be-
lieved that:
[W]e have spent a great amount of time on something which is very bas-
ically legislative. The abuses that have been mentioned I think we will
have as long as we have men. There are always abuses.
3 PROCEEDINGS 1462.
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that the Committee recommendation provided the potential for multiple
hearings. Delegate Lennon read section 23 as requiring a preliminary
hearing any time a person is "held to answer." He argued that an accused
is held to answer after a complaint is lodged, at which time a hearing
would be required; and that he is also held to answer after indictment
at which time another hearing would be necessary. 63 Noting that no final-
ity would attach to a hearing held prior to indictment, and that therefore,
a finding of no probable cause might still lead to indictment and a second
hearing, Delegate Jaskula envisioned a "vicious circle."64
. The protestations of the Committee majority and its supporters notwith-
standing, Lennon's "latent" provision carried by a vote of fifty-three to.
thirty-seven. The constitution at this point contained a grand jury but
no preliminary hearing.
The effort to include within the Bill of Rights some provision regarding
the preliminary hearing was not to be denied. Delegate Parkhurst, chair-
man of the Local Government Committee, stepped outside the environs
of "home rule" to offer an "amendment" to Lennon's "latent" provision.:
It was actually a substitution, since its acceptance would result in the re-
surrection of the preliminary hearing immediately, rather, than upon legis-.
lative abolition or limitation of the grand jury. The amendment, after
perfecting language was added, managed to pass and provided that:
Unless the initial charge has been brought by indictment of a grand jury,
no person shall be held to answer for a crime punishable by death or im-
prisonment in the penitentiary without a prompt preliminary hearing to es-
tablish probable cause. 65
Parkhurst believed that his amendment would accomplish what he per-
ceived to be the common goal of both the advocates and the opponents
of the preliminary hearing section, "namely, to see that anybody accused
of a crime gets one shot at having some decision on probable cause, but
not two." 66
Delegate Weisberg, the Convention's chief advocate of a constitutional
right to a preliminary hearing, believed that initial indictments should be
reviewed, although he recognized the substantial discomfort created by. this
notion. At the same time, he was aware that the initial indictment was
a relative rarity. Therefore, "if there [was] concern with just that as-
63. See 3 PROCEEDINGS 1457.
64. Id. at 1455.
65. 6 PROCEEDINGS 203 (Committee on Style, Drafting and Submission, Proposal
Number 4).
66. 3 PRQ"EF INQS 1460,
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pect of it,"67 he was willing to accept Parkhurst's proposal, as he preferred
"to take care of what. [he guessed was] more than 95 percent of the cases
where the problem can come up .. ",08
Parkhurst's stated purpose, however, when combined with the language-,
of his amendment, posed some questions for the delegates:. (1) Would,
not the existence of a grand jury provide the one desired shot at probable
cause?; (2) Was Parkhurst implying that one procedure is as acceptable
as the other as a means of determining probable cause?; and, therefore
(3) Since a preliminary hearing would not be required if the individual
were arrested after indictment, could it be inferred that what Parkhurst
was really concerned with was the hardship of incarceration without some
determination of probable cause, and not the actual holding of the hear-.
ing?
Delegate Jaskula drew the third inference suggested above and pro-
posed that the preliminary hearing be required "unless a true bill has been
voted by the grand jury." 69 In other words, if an individual were arrested
prior to indictment, he would be entitled to a hearing unless the prosecutor
were able to obtain an indictment before any hearing had beei held.70
Weisberg urged Parkhurst to reject Jaskula's suggestion, since it would al-
low the prosecutor to obtain an indictment without ever having to present
a case at the preliminary hearing. 71  Parkhurst, heeding Weisberg's ad-
vice, rejected Jaskula's perfecting language.
This rejection seemed to have established the preliminary- hearing as
a prerequisite to any indictment which was not an initial charge.7 2  The
Illinois Supreme Court, however, has taken a different view.
.67. Id. at 1462.- .
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1469.
70. The Jaskula proposal was the equivalent of the Statutory provision that
a preliminary hearing-or examination upon the complaint-or information.
shall be conducted ... unless the defendant waives such.hearing or exami-
nation or unless a Bill of Indictment upon the same felony charge is re-
turned ... -prior to such hearing or examination.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,, § 111-2(a) (1973)..
71. Jaskula's suggestion would
mean that a preliminary hearing right could bie easily defeated whenever
a prosecutor chose to do so by simply postponing a preliminary hearing
.-- until he obtains.a grand jury. indictment, and then point to.the-section and..
say there is no right to a preliminary hearing in view of the "unless" clause.
3 PROCEEDINGS 1469.
72. The rejection of the Jaskula proposal was noted by Justice Ward in his dis-
senting opinion in People v. Hendrix, 54 Ill. 2d 165, 295 N.E.2d 724 (1973), as sup-
port for the notion that unless the initial charge were brought by way of indictment,
a -preliminary hearing must be held before the defendant is indicted. See -54 Ill. 2d
at 172-73, 295 N.E.2d at 728. 1 . * I " ." ."
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ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 GOES TO COURT
The Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Kent,73 has stated that the
purpose of the preliminary hearing section is to "insure that the existence
of probable cause will be determined promptly either by a grand jury or
by a judge."' 74  The implication of this statement is, of course, that the
preliminary hearing section seeks only to avoid delay in the determination
of probable cause by some method; the section does not seek to insure
that the preliminary hearing must be held prior to an indictment which
is not an initial charge.
The court, in Kent, supported its explanation by referring to the change
in the Committee recommendation brought about by the passage of the
-Parkhurst amendment. The Committee, the court said, would have re-
quired a preliminary hearing to follow initial indictments, but abandoned
the idea upon the delegates' acceptance of the Parkhurst amendment.
Given the court's conclusion, the following rationale must have been
applied.
By requiring no hearing after initial indictments, the grand jury must be
viewed as providing the same function as the preliminary hearing: deter-
mining probable cause. If, in any event, there must be an indictment
before the charge may be tried, it appears that, by passing the Parkhurst
amendment, the delegates were seeking to insure that one arrested prior
to indictment would not be held for prolonged periods while awaiting
grand jury deliberation. Thus, if the true bill is returned prior to the
hearing, the above purpose will have been achieved. The delegates were
not, on the other hand, establishing that the method used in placing the
initial charge would determine whether a preliminary hearing is required.
The court also supported its notion of the purpose of the preliminary
hearing section by pointing to the section's language and the explanation
thereof provided by the Committee on Style, Drafting, and Submission.
The explanation reads:
This change [from the language of the first draft7 5 to the present language7 6 ]
makes it clear that a person must either be charged initially by a grand jury
indictment or given a prompt preliminary hearing before being held to an-
swer for a crime.. . .77
73. 54 I1. 2d 161, 295 N.E.2d 710 (1973).
74. Id. at 163, 295 N.E.2d at 711 (emphasis added).
75. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
76. See text accompanying note 78 infra.
77. 7 PROCEEDINGS 2600 (Committee on Style, Drafting and Submission, Number
15) (emphasis added).
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This language does not, however, support the idea that a promptly re-
turned true bill is the equivalent of a prompt preliminary hearing, as the
court suggested.
The preliminary hearing section provides that:
No person shall be held . . . unless either the initial charge has been
brought by indictment . . . or the person has been given a prompt pre-
liminary hearing .... 78
The language, unless either (A) initially indicted or (B) given a prelimin-
ary hearing, is equivalent to unless (A) or unless (B). Therefore, the
unless clause of section 7 is satisfied if either (A) or (B) is satisfied.
If the accused has been initially indicted, (A) is satisfied, and clearly no
preliminary hearing is required. If (A) is not satisfied, the requirements
of the section are met only if (B) is satisfied. An intervening indictment
is not an initial charge and would not satisfy (A). An intervening indict-
ment is a determination of probable cause, but it is not a preliminary
hearing, and thus does not satisfy (B). Therefore, neither the language
nor the explanation of article I, section 7 supports the Kent court's con-
clusion that the promptly returned true bill and the promptly held hearing
are equivalent. Moreover, the Convention debates disclose evidence in-
dicating that the method of placing the initial charge was meant to deter-
mine whether the preliminary hearing was to be held.
Delegate Weisberg, who was instrumental in providing the language
of the Parkhurst amendment, 79 believed:
the initial charge language [was] . . . designed to make sure there is no dup-
lication or no right to a second preliminary hearing in the situations where
the first charge . . . is by grand jury indictment; that in the case where
[the charge is filed prior to indictment], that those are the cases where there
should be a right to a preliminary hearing.80
Mr. Parkhurst, in explaining how his amendment would work, also focused
on the method of placing the initial charge:
If you do it by indictment, then there is no preliminary hearing. That's got
to be first. If you do it the other way around [arrest precedes indictment],
he has a right to a preliminary hearing, and that's what's intended.8 1
78. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 7 (emphasis added).
79. When Parkhurst initially offered his proposal, he suggested that "[uln the
absence of an indictment . . . no person shall be held to answer . . . without a
prompt preliminary hearing." 3 PROCEEDINGS 1461 (emphasis added). Weisberg
perfected the language by substituting "except where the initial charge is by indict-
ment of the grand jury" for "in the absence of indictment". Id. He believed his
language "would take care of the small percentage of cases where the prosecution
goes first to the grand jury-and where there is some concern expressed about the
judge then sitting and duplica4.ing the probable cause finding of the grand jury." Id.
80. Id. at 1469 (emphasis added).
81. Id. (emphasis added).
1975]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Finally, the rejection of the Jaskula proposal indicates that the supporters
of the Parkhurst amendment intended to make certain that the right to
a preliminary hearing was a consequence of an arrest before indictment.
The debate surrounding the passage of the Parkhurst amendment does,
therefore, support the notion that the right to a preliminary hearing is ac-
quired upon the placing of a charge which is not an initial indictment.
But was it the intention of the Convention that this right to a preliminary
hearing could somehow be extinguished, or, on the other hand, did the
Parkhurst amendment clearly establish the preliminary hearing as a pre-
requisite to the return of an indictment which was not an initial charge?
The court, in Kent, by finding a promptly returned indictment equivalent
to a prompt preliminary hearing, answered the two parts of this question
yes and no respectively. The justices believed that the preliminary hear-
ing section presented an issue of "when" and not "how." But the debates
can support an answer of no and yes; the issue may be viewed as one
of "how" as well as "when."
The Committee recommended that preliminary hearings be held in all
cases because it felt that a decision based upon only one side of the case
was most likely to be no more than a routine ratification of the prosecutor's
own judgment. 83 This notion definitely applies to situations in which an
individual is arrested prior to indictment.84 If a preliminary hearing were
not required, it would seem obvious that only evidence probative of guilt
would be presented to the grand jurors, who would be unlikely to look
beyond the evidence presented to them. This type of review would pro-
vide the accused with no effective buffer against unwarranted prosecution.
The fact that the decision would be promptly reached is irrelevant. If
,the preliminary hearing were made the prerequisite to indictment in this
situation, the defendant would have a meaningful opportunity to establish
that the charge he faces is unwarranted.
Mr. Weisberg, the father of the preliminary hearing section's "unless"
clause, 85 was not merely seeking, as the court suggested, to insure a
82. See text accompanying notes 68-72 supra.
83. -See text accompanying note 9 supra.
84. It is submitted that Mr. Weisberg (and presumably those who voted in favor
of the Parkhurst Amendment) was willing to provide for a preliminary hearing in
only those cases (95%) where arrest preceded indictment because, if grand jury de-
liberation were allowed to follow arrest directly, the likelihood of critical review
would be almost non-existent. See note 30 supra. On the other hand, grand jury
deliberation which precedes arrest (besides being relatively rare) need not involve
only the presentation of evidence designed by the prosecutor to suggest guilt; it may
involve investigation. The prosecutor may very well recommend indictment after all
"investigation" has been completed. But the recommendation will not result from
a notion conceived prior to entry into the grand jury room.
85. See note 79 supra.
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prompt determination of probable cause. When it was suggested that the
words "to answer" be deleted from the Committee's recommendation in
order to avoid the confusion which existed at one time over the possibility
of holding multiple hearings,8 6 Weisberg responded: "to delete the words
'to answer' might possibly invite an interpretation . that this would deal
with custody rather than the requirement that a person stand trial."87 If
this were the import of the section prior to the passage of the Lennon
amendment, it is only reasonable that it remained so upon the acceptance
of the Parkhurst amendment. It was, in other words, the method of
determining probable cause, and not merely its prompt resolution, which
Weisberg sought to achieve by supporting the Parkhurst amendment after
the Committee's recommendation appeared doomed. The preliminary
hearing would be necessary so that "before (the defendant) is bound over
to the grand jury . . . he has one judicial review-one judge making an
independent decision that there is probable cause."88
Divining the intent of a constitutional provision requires examining the
thoughts of those responsible for its promulgation. The Illinois Supreme
Court is willing to do so.
In prior opinions we have attached great weight to the views expressed by
the delegates to the Constitutional Convention . . . ; but in those instances
the proceedings indicated a consensus demonstrative of the delegates' in-
tent.8 9
Nonetheless, the views of Delegates Weisberg and Parkhurst, which sup-
ported an interpretation differing from the one reached by the court, were
not cited in Kent. But in fairness, the court could have pointed to factors
which indicated that a consensus was lacking regarding the proper alloca-
tion of function between the grand jury and the preliminary hearing.
First, prior to the passage of, but after debate concerning the Parkhurst
amendment, the Convention had 'deactivated" the preliminary hearing
86. See text accompanying notes 63-64 supra.
87. 3 PROCEEDINGS 1460 (emphasis addedi.
88. .d. The preliminary hearing was viewed not merely as a method of ensuring
a prompt resolution of the probable cause issue:
The impor:ance of [the preliminary hearing] is . . . not only that [the de-
fendant] is deprived of his liberty at that point . . . but also . . . that the
preliminary hearing does serve a very important function of screening out
cases at that very early stage which is very, very critical for the defendant,
and for the prosecution as well.
Id. at 1454 (emphasis added).
• 89. Paper Supply Co. v. City of Chicago, 57 Ill. 2d 553, 570, 317 N.E.2d 3, 12
(1974) (emphasis added).
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while retaining the grand jury. This indicates that shortly before the pas-
sage of the Parkhurst amendment the preliminary hearing was viewed as
providing the same function as the grand jury. Therefore, the "resurrec-
tion" of the preliminary hearing could represent only an attempt to insure
a prompt determination of probable cause, as the Kent court suggested.
Second, in order for the preliminary hearing to provide the balanced
view of the evidence Weisberg desired, the accused would have to have
substantially the same rights at the preliminary hearing as he would have
at trial. While the Committee intended these rights to be extended,90 it
is not clear that this intention was widely shared.9 1 If the defendant at
the preliminary hearing has no adversary rights, there appears no compel-
ling reason to favor the preliminary hearing over the grand jury as a
method of determining probable cause. 92
The evidence, therefore, which indicates that the preliminary hearing
section was designed not merely to (1) provide a prompt determination
of probable cause, but to (2) provide an opportunity to avoid unwarranted
prosecution through an adversary test, must be weighed against the evi-
dence which indicates it was only the former purpose the Convention
sought to achieve. If the court in Kent were to have held that the section
was designed to accomplish both purposes, it would have had to accept
the following propositions: (a) unwarranted prosecutions may be avoided
if a balanced view of the evidence is had when determining probable
cause; (b) the preliminary hearing may not extend to the defendant the
90. See 6 PROCEEDINGS 75.
91. Some delegates did not believe that the defendant at the preliminary hearing
had the right to cross-examine or present evidence. See 3 PROCEEDINGS 1454; 3 PRO-
CEEDINGS 1464. Another delegate believed that the defendant had a right to cross-
examine, but not to present evidence. See 3 PROCEEDINGS 1472. "Subsequent to
Con-Con, there is still no consensus as to what a preliminary hearing entails. Prac-
tice varies around the State." Duff & Harrison, The Grand Jury in Illinois: To
Slaughter a Sacred Cow, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 635, 657 n.73. Efforts to provide the
rights of cross-examination and presenting evidence, via legislation, have not suc-
ceeded in Illinois. See note 38 supra.
92. It may be suggested that the preliminary hearing is preferable to the grandjury because a judge, given his expertise, is better able than a lay person to recognize
probable cause. This suggestion would dictate that the judge's decision should con-
trol. However, the Committee Report, 6 PROCEEDINGS 76, as well as the Convention
debates, see, e.g., 3 PROCEEDINGS 1455, clearly establish that the judge's decision is
not binding upon the prosecutor. Indeed, if the judge were to find probable cause,
the grand jury might, although it is extremely unlikely, refuse to indict. See Calkins,
supra note 1, at 440. The lack of finality which attaches to the decision reached
at the preliminary hearing, therefore, does little to convince a court that a prelimi-
nary hearing must precede an indictment which is not an initial charge.
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tools necessary to achieve a balanced view; (c) the decision reached at
-the preliminary hearing is not, in any event, binding on the prosecutor;
and (d) the prosecutor may, therefore, seek an indictment notwithstand-
ing a judge's finding of no probable cause.
Thus, if the preliminary hearing were found to be the prerequisite of
an indictment which is not an initial charge, there would be no way of
assuring an individual that he would not have to face a charge that had
earlier been found to be unwarranted. If prosecution were to be avoided,
it would not be because the constitution had provided a mechanism for
determining probable cause whose result was deserving of finality.
Rather, it would be avoided only if the prosecutor chose to honor the
judge's finding. 93 As the constitution vests the ultimate judgment of the
prosecutor's case in the grand jury, there appears no compelling reason
to require a judge's nonfinal factual determination to precede grand jury
deliberation. The court in Kent, by defining the purpose of the prelim-
inary hearing section as insuring a prompt determination of probable cause
by either grand jury or judge, indicated that no such compelling reason
was suggested by the Convention delegates.
After a finding of no probable cause at the preliminary hearing, the de-
fendant in Kent was indicted by the grand jury upon the same evidence
that was rejected at the hearing. The defendant argued that section 7
required the quashing of the indictment. But the court held that the find-
93. In explaining the operation of the Parkhurst Amendment, Mr. Weisberg spe-
cifically stated that an intervening indictment (one returned after arrest but before
the scheduled hearing) would not obviate the necessity of the hearing;
[It is required] because the initial charge . . . would be the charge filed
by the police officer or perhaps the . . . prosecutor, but in any case, before
any grand jury proceedings.
3 PROCEEDINGS 1462. This statement, while it appears to directly contradict the
court's suggestion in Kent that a promptly returned indictment makes unnecessary
the holding of a hearing, points up a basic weakness in the preliminary hearing sec-
tion. It concedes that after arrest a prosecutor may go directly to the grand jury.
Thus, if an indictment were returned and a judge later determined that probable cause
did not, in fact, exist, would not re-indictment become a certainty? It appears it
would, as once having convinced the grand jurors that trial was warranted, the prose-
cutor would likely disregard the judge's finding. The second indictment would not
be reviewed as it would represent an initial charge. Perhaps, if the preliminary
hearing were a prerequisite to indictment, after arrest, the prosecutor would be
less inclined to dishonor a judge's finding regarding probable cause. But even disre-
garding Weisberg's failure to state, when he had the opportunity to do so, that the
preliminary hearing is a prerequisite to indictment, the fact remains, that by failing
to limit access to the grand jury, the judge's finding controls only when the prosecu-
tor chooses to honor it.
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ing of no probable cause is not binding on the grand jury.94 This holding
is consistent with the view that the preliminary hearing serves only as a
first test of the defendant's "custody." But more importantly, the holding
is dictated by the language of section 7 itself. After charges are dismissed
at the preliminary hearing, the defendant is not being held to answer.
However, section 7 does not provide that he may not subsequently be held
to answer. In other words, the section does not make a judge's finding
of probable cause a prerequisite to indictment. 95
The issue to be decided in Kent was whether the indictment following
the preliminary hearing was valid. In resolving this issue, the court de-
cided much more than was necessary. The statement that section 7 seeks
to insure a prompt determination of probable cause by either a judge or
a grand jury was unnecessary to the resolution of the case, and could be
viewed as dictum if it were not for the case of People v. Hendrix.96
In Hendrix, the defendant was indicted one day after arrest. A prelim-.
inary hearing was never held, although the prosecutor offered to hold one
in order to cure any possible defect. The defendant refused the offer,
contending that an indictment must be preceded by a preliminary hearing
unless the indictment represents the initial charge. The court, noting that
the proffered hearing was waived, concluded that:
The second paragraph of section 7 does not provide a grant of immunity
• . . as a sanction for its violation. Nor would an interpretation make
sense which requires the dismissal of the present indictment and the dis-
charge of the defendant to be followed by reindictment and rearrest ...
What is a prompt preliminary hearing must, of course, depend upon an ap-
praisal of all the relevant circumstances, and in this case it does not appear
that there was any violation of the defendant's constitutional right to a
prompt preliminary hearing.9 7
94. In our opinion the language of the constitutional provision, as well as
the history of its evolution, negates any thought that its purpose was to at-
tach finality to a finding of no probable cause, or to establish mutually ex-
clusive procedures, so that grand jury proceedings would be barred if an ac-
cused had been discharged upon preliminary hearing.
People v. Kent, 54 Ill. 2d 161, 163-64, 295 N.E.2d 710, 712 (1973).
95. The sugeestion that a preliminary hearing be required prior to indictment
where the individual was not under arrest was rejected by the Committee, (see 6 PRO-
CEEDINGs 41) and never considered by the Convention. The Committee's statement
that "[a] discharge [would] be without prejudice to the prosecution's ability to insti-
tute new charge," 6 PROCEEDINGS.76, was never challenged during debate. While the
prosecutor was expected, by- the Committee, "to institute new charges upon being sa-
tisfied that evidence . . . is sufficient to establish probable cause," id., there was
never any attempt, by the Convention, to fashion some means whereby the evidence
presented to the grand jury could be compared to that which was rejected at the pre-
liminary hearing.
- 96.-- 54 I11. 2d 165, 295 N.E.2d 724 (1973).
97. Id. at 169, 295 NE.2d at 727.
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The court seems to be saying that section 7 will be violated, technically,
if the preliminary hearing does not precede an indictment which is not an
initial charge. Yet in Kent, it seemed that a prompt indictment was unob-.
jectionable, as it represented the equivalent of a prompt preliminary hear-
ing. In any event, the court in Hendrix did not believe that dismissal of
the -indictment with or without immunity was the -proper remedy. -,.The
court could have cited its language in Kent to dispell any lingering notions
that the preliminary hearing is a prerequisite to an indictment that is not.
an initial charge; it did not do so. Lower courts, however, have read
Hendrix as if the supreme court had done just that.98
SEEKING RELIEF BEFORE INDICTMENT
The Illinois courts have made clear' that "prompt" intervening indict-
ments are not invalidated by the failure to hold a preliminary hearing, and
that the prosecutor is not bound by the finding reached at the hearing.
What stands unresolved is the method of effectuating whatever right re-
mains in the "constitutional right to a preliminary hearing."
The Fifth District'of the Illinois Appellate Court'has held that a defend.
ant's right to a prompt preliminary hearing may be violated by, failing. to
afford him a prompt determination of probable cause, but that the viola-
tion will not result in the overturning of a conviction:.
[D]efendant was not given a preliminary hearing, and even the indictment
was not "prompt," as defendant was not indicted until 65 days after his ar-
rest. We hold that this violated the defendant's constitutional right to a
prompt preliminary hearing.
We must therefore determine what action is appropriate to remedy this
violation . . . . Under the rationale of Hendrix we are obliged to hold that
this error does not invalidate the conviction. 99
The fifth- district's recognition that' a violation can occur dictates. that
some remedy be available prior to indictment. The. appropriate remedy
to be afforded depends upon the nature of the violation. If the failure
to hold a preliminary hearing is considered an omission which makes the
98. Summarizing the court in Hendrix it would appear that the substance of
the court's holding was that it was not necessary to afford an accused a
preliminary hearing and that he could under the 1970 Constitution be in-
dicted directly by the grand jury.
People v. Brown, 11 Ill. App. 3d 67, 69-70, 296 N.E.2d 77, 79 (2d Dist. 1973). See
also People v. Williams, 20 I11. App. 3d 840, 314 N.E.2d 276 (1st Dist. 1974); People
v. Howell, 16 Ill. App. 3d 989, 307 N.E.2d 172 (5th Dist. 1974), (appeal allowed,
No. 46625).
99, People v. Howell, 16 111. App."3d 989, 992-93, 307 N.E.2d 172, 174.(5th Dist.
1974) (appeal allowed, No. 46625).
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arrestee's detention illegal, habeas corpus is the proper remedy. 100 If the
judge's failure to hold a preliminary hearing is considered the nonperform-
ance of a ministerial duty, mandamus will lie.' 0 '
Habeas Corpus
The Convention debates indicate that a failure to hold a preliminary
hearing does not attach illegality to the defendant's detention.' 0 2  There-
fore, even if a constitutional command were violated, state habeas corpus
would not lie.' 03
Assuming an exhaustion of state remedies, 0 4 federal habeas corpus will
lie if a defendant "is in custody in violation of the Constitution . . .of
the United States."' 05 It has been held that the fourth amendment re-
quires that state authorities, in the absence of indictment, establish at a
hearing that probable cause exists to support an arrest.'0 6 Therefore, if
an individual has been charged but not indicted, and has exhausted state
remedies, he may allege in a federal petition for habeas corpus that his
constitutional right to a determination of probable cause has been violated.
He will succeed in obtaining relief if he can establish that he is "in cus-
tody."
The defendant who is sitting in jail is obviously in custody, but actual
physical custody is not a prerequisite to federal habeas relief.'07 As a gen-
eral principle, the defendant who has been released on bond has been
found to be sufficiently restrained of his liberty to qualify for relief.' 08
But in determining whether the defendant who has been charged but not
100. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 65, § 22(2) (1973).
101. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Municipal Court of Chicago, 28 Ill. App.
2d 401, 171 N.E.2d 687 (Ist Dist. 1961).
102. Delegate Weisberg: "We [the Committee majority] do not intend here that
a person would have to be released unless and until he has a preliminary hearing."
3 PROCEEDINGS 1460.
103. People ex rel. Lewis v. Frye, 42 Ill. 2d 311, 247 N.E.2d 410 (1969).
104. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1970).
106. Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nom.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 414 U.S. 1062 (1973); Brown v. Fauntelroy, 442 F.2d 838 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Cooley v. Stone, 414 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See note 36 supra.
107. [B]esides physical imprisonment there are other restraints on a man's
liberty, restraints not shared by the public generally, which have been
thought sufficient in the English-speaking world to support the issuance of
habeas corpus.
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963).
108. See, e.g., U.S. v. Croft, 450 F.2d 1094 (6th Cir. 1971); Marden v. Purdy,
409 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1969); Duncombe v. New York, 267 F. Supp. 103 (S.D.N.Y.
1967). But see United States ex rel. Meyer v. Weil, 458 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert, denied, 409 U.S. 1060, reh'g denied 412 US. 914 (1973).
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indicted or given a preliminary hearing qualifies for relief, the restraints
provided by bail are really not in issue:
To legally arrest and detain, the Government must assert probable cause to
believe the arrestee has committed a crime. Arrest is a public act that may
seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bail or
not. .. .109
Therefore, the "in custody" requirement is satisfied by virtue of the arrest,
and the physical location of the defendant is irrelevant. 110
The restraint in question is in violation of the Constitution not because
probable cause does not exist, but because it has not been established.
Thus, the defendant's proper relief is the holding of a hearing to establish
the existence or non-existence of probable cause."' The proper relief is
not release. The request for a hearing is obtainable even though release
is not demanded. Federal habeas relief is not dependent upon a request
for immediate release."12
Mandamus
It is clear that although the Illinois Constitution requires a judge to set
a date for a preliminary hearing, the setting of a specific date and the
granting of continuances are within judicial discretion."'l Thus, if the ac-
cused but non-indicted arrestee were to maintain in a mandamus proceed-
ing that the judge be ordered to hold a preliminary hearing to determine
probable cause, the defendant would be faced with the contention that
mandamus will not be used to control the exercise of judicial discretion."14
In order to succeed, the petitioner would have to establish that "to prevent
discretionary power from being exercised with manifest injustice" 1 5 man-
damus should lie, or alternatively, that the failure to hold a preliminary
hearing within "X" days of arrest has been an abuse of discretion." 6
i09. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971).
110. See Note, Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L.
REV. 1040, 1076 (1970).
111. Cf. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968): "Where [habeas corpus relief]
is available, it assumes among other things that a prisoner may require his jailer to
justify the detention under law." Id. at 58.
112. Carafas v. La Vallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); see also Ward v. Henderson,
317 F. Supp. 344 (W.D. La. 1970).
113. Note 46 supra; see also 6 PROCEEDINGS 75.
114. People ex rel. Cont'l Air Transport Co. v. Strouse, 41 Ill. 2d 567, 244
N.E.2d 171 (1969).
115. People ex rel. Shell Oil Co. v. City of Chicago, 9 Ill. App. 3d 242, 245,
292 N.E.2d 84, 87 (1st Dist. 1972).
116. People ex rel. Collins v. Young;, 83 111. App. 2d 312, 227 N.E.2d 524 (3d
Dist. 1967) (Mandamus will lie to prevent a clear abuse of discretion.).
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In the absence of legislation or a supreme court rule which states when
the preliminary hearing is to be held and which provides guidelines for
the granting of continuances, it would appear difficult to establish an
"abuse of discretion." The determination of "manifest injustice" appears
similarly difficult.
CONCLUSION
Because the grand jury provides no meaningful buffer when it is asked
only to review a prosecutor's decision to charge an offense, access to the
grand jury must be restricted. The grand jury should be used only as an
investigative tool in situations where the prosecutor is unable to adequately
perform his investigative responsibilities. "[A] grand jury should be con-
vened whenever the judge believes it can be of value in the investigation
of criminal activity .... 1117 When investigative services are not needed,
the grand jury should play no part in the determination of probable cause.
Such a determination of probable cause should be made only at an adver-
sary preliminary hearing.
The existence of two mechanisms, the grand jury and the preliminary
hearing, each empowered to make a probable cause determination, sug-
gests that the former may be substituted for the latter. The supporters
of the Parkhurst amendment indicated that the substitution is unwarranted
when arrest precedes indictment. However, uncertainty as to how the pre-
liminary hearing operates and the lack of finality attaching to the decision
reached at the hearing, encouraged the Illinois Supreme Court to find
equivalent a "promptly" returned indictment and a preliminary hearing.
The possibility of obtaining an indictment without ever having to hold
a hearing creates a certain probability"" that the hearing will, in fact, not
be held."19 Thus, indictments are assured which will represent neither an
117. Morse, supra note 3, at 364.
118. See note 98 supra and the cases cited therein.
119. The question arises as to why the prosecutor would desire to avoid the pre-
liminary hearing. If there is no problem getting a case before the grand jury, the
answer would appear to be that as long ag an indictment is required before trial can
begin, the prosecutor might as well go before the grand jurors as soon as possible.
Would, however, the prosecutor -seek, to avoid a hearing to deny the defendant dis-
covery? The Illinois discovery rules, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, §§ 411-15 (1973),
are liberal and become applicable following indictment. . Id. at § 411. Therefore,
by avoiding the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor will not be able to avoid provid-
ing the defendant with, for example, lists of witnesses (id. at § 412(a)(i)), defend-
ant's own statement (id. at § 41.2(a)(ii)), books, papers, photographs and the like(id. at § 412(a)(v)). It is, therefore, only reasonable to assume'that the prosecu-
tor who seeks to delay the preliminary hearing or avoid it altogether through repeated
continuances does so because evidence does not exist, at the time of the scheduled
hearing, which. would justify:an arrest....... .-.
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independent nor balanced view of probable cause.
The failure to implement by legislation or supreme court rule the consti-
tutional requirement that preliminary hearings be promptly held assures
unnecessary and, inevitably, inconsistant decisions regarding the exercise
of judicial discretion. The absence of definite "time" guidelines, as well
as "continuance" guidelines, creates the probability that some defendants
will have to assume the burdens of a criminal charge while the prosecutor
seeks evidence to justify the disability.
Edward D. Stern
